The Philosophical Question of the “Concept”: Beyond Kant

License Creative Commons

Steen Knudsen Esquerda

Defining the term concept may already appear a complex task, but attempting to define the very concept of concept is an even greater challenge. This question has been a subject of inquiry throughout the history of philosophy, with many traditions and thinkers examining its nature. Over the past centuries, Kantian heritage has been the most influential in this regard. Yet, is there a contemporary way to address the notion of concept, one that resists definitive closures?

According to Immanuel Kant, a concept is a cognitive framework that allows us to recognise something as it is, beyond its superficial appearances. For Kant, the concept is not contingent upon linguistic expressions but resides in the domain of human understanding, acting as a filter through which we make sense of the world. This Prussian philosopher’s interpretation left an enduring mark on subsequent philosophical thought, particularly on neo-Kantian currents that profoundly influenced 20th-century thinkers such as Reinhart Koselleck. For the German historian, concepts are not closed entities; instead, they transform human experience (Erfahrung) into subjective and personalised lived experiences (Erlebnis). Concepts, in this view, mediate between sensory perception and our capacity to articulate it linguistically.

However, this perspective has not been immune to critique. The Kantian paradigm raises important questions, for instance, How are concepts given to us? A concept can be as abstract as “democracy,” yet not everything seems capable of being a concept—Can we speak of the “concept of a dog”? The shortcomings of this approach have become more apparent since the linguistic turn in philosophy, which questioned the separation between thought and language.

In this context, it is noteworthy that Michel Foucault, a thinker influenced by Kant despite himself, did not explicitly thematise the problem of the concept in his work. Nevertheless, his archaeology of discursive regularities established a framework for understanding how statements, including conceptual ones, emerge, distribute, and dissipate. His legacy has been further developed by Adi Ophir, who, in a recent article, proposes thinking of the concept as “performed” in the act of “conceptualisation”. This shift moves the question from What is a concept? to What conditions must be met for a concept to emerge?

A concept arises under specific conditions. These conditions relate to its relationship with the field of objects to which it is connected—whether past, present, or potential—with the subjects who articulate and sustain it, with adjacent concepts it encounters, and with the material aspects of its existence, that is, the discursive practices that embody it.

What, then, is a “conceptualisation”? It is not the justification or defence of a term. Conceptualisation is no more than the exposition of a concept’s multiplicity—the presentation of an enumeration, a diagram. The concept operates as a unified schema of two movements: on one hand, individuation, which concretises it in relation to specific contexts; on the other, generalisation, which expands it by applying it to a variety of broader contexts or events.

When does a conceptualisation occur in space? It emerges when the discursive plane of language and its denotative function are brought into question. For conceptualisation to take place, both the speaker and the listener must share a particular interest in the concept, and dialogue must allow the question, What does x mean? The discussion need not conclude in consensus; indeed, consensus may be the enemy of the concept. A concept remains alive only insofar as aspects of its definition remain unresolved or unaccepted.

This holds true not only for the concept’s internal structure but also for its permanent relationship with other terms, ideas, and practices, which compel it to evolve. A concept will always depend on the external structures that sustain it, even as these structures push it towards transformation. A concept arises whenever it is displaced from its original discourse and forced into a space between enunciative fields. Within its original context, it might not even be recognisable as such. It is in this “in-between” space that it becomes questionable. But how can the concept be sustained in this interregnum? Ophir defines the materiality of the concept by two features: first, there must be time for conceptualisation—a specific kind of time, a “time to waste”; second, there must be a medium or public space that enables the exchange necessary for conceptualisation, akin to what Kant referred to as the “public use of reason”.

Ophir’s approach, moving beyond strict analysis, reminds us that neither the concept nor conceptualisation is a neutral act. We must remain attentive to the conditions that make conceptualisation possible, ensuring they do not erode. A concept, then, is an open, dynamic process, rich with potential reinterpretations. Far from those who claim philosophy must seek fixed meanings, perennial answers, and hidden solutions, we would do well to view the discipline as one charged with sustaining the conditions for concepts to come to life: a time to waste and a space to live in common.

Source: educational EVIDENCE

Rights: Creative Commons