Trust and populism

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Spanish teachers have been gagged in the name of a spurious technical infallibility

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Andreu Navarra

I cannot stop getting the most out of one of this year’s most important books: Una teoría crítica de la inteligencia artificial (Galaxia Gutenberg), by Daniel Innerarity, Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of the Basque Country. Among other reasons, it serves as a safeguard against all forms of populism and absolutist temptation; its voice is consistently clear and measured. The governance models it proposes may guide us in understanding the current state of our educational politics, how we might reorient them, and how to avoid the extremisms that exacerbate existing challenges.

The prevailing atmosphere is one of profound dispossession: “The expression ‘take back control’ was the slogan of the Brexit supporters but, beyond being a political propaganda catchphrase, it corresponds to a broader movement of resistance against the real or perceived loss of control we experience in the face of sophisticated technology and politics, in a context of increasing complexity. This mentality characterises not only certain political actors but also broad social sectors and certain elemental instincts of retreat, protection, and the desire to reclaim spaces of familiarity and intelligibility” (p. 337). The crucial issue is to avoid populist myths and the temptation for radical rupture, while maintaining general trust in the system: “There exists an excessive confidence in constituent power and an equally excessive suspicion of constituted power. Resistance to delegation lies at the root of the crisis of representation, conceived as a poor substitute for direct democracy” (p. 338).

Elsewhere, Innerarity observes: “Populism claims a form of direct control over reality, understood as the recovery of something once possessed—prior to delegation—but which, in fact, we have never had. From this perspective, populism could be defined as an overestimation of direct control and an underestimation of indirect control; it presumes that control is not so much an aspiration as something to be regained. With this kind of social contract mythology, taken literally rather than as a fiction explaining the legitimacy of political construction processes, the paradoxical nature of all power cannot be understood” (p. 342).

The topic is fascinating, and I have been reflecting on it for months. How are contemporary authoritarianisms articulated, and where do they originate? Has anyone seriously assessed the impact of the 2008 crisis—irrational and externally imposed—on our political legitimacy?

In my view, Innerarity may have overlooked a potential scenario: what if constituted power itself decides to present itself as constituent power and instigate revolutionary rupture? What if the executive initiates a widespread campaign against the “constituted power” of academics? This is precisely what recent large-scale pedagogical reforms indicate: an unprecedented technological and social transformation, laden with evident myths, that changes everything, erases established structures, and redefines the landscape anew—without evaluation, without accountability, and presented as the recovery of direct control against the alleged infamy of the teaching caste, crudely caricatured. In effect, recognising a rumour of ultra-reactionary rebellion in the environment, it is actually constituted power that has begun to appropriate the “anti-system” label to attack an unarmed and unflattering middle class, including secondary and university teachers.

The temptation to indulge in so-called populist teacherphobia – that is, teacher-bashing- has further undermined a system already reduced to minimal standards. Teachers have been denied the possibility of success or failure; they have been subjected to successive waves of bureaucratic discipline and presented with absolute solutions without deliberation or appeal. Spanish teachers have been gagged in the name of a spurious technical infallibility. Yet, “a democracy produces better decisions than its alternative models, but its ultimate legitimacy does not derive from the quality of its decisions, rather from the popular authorisation behind those decisions” (p. 367). The problem has been exacerbated when genuine pedagogical needs were replaced by purely commercial or market-driven priorities. Opinions were not confronted; risks and responsibilities were not debated. The outcomes of previous organic constituent disruptions were not evaluated. Phaeton’s chariot remains unbridled, on the verge of collapse. What is the solution? Innerarity suggests: “to renounce direct control in order to gain general control”, which amounts to neutralising deregulating and constituent pressures through negotiated reformism, lifting the oppressive grip of unintelligible irrationalism suffocating teachers. A balance must be found between destructive populist irrationality (deeply rooted in official channels) and constructive resistance. This is the deliberative environment the administration refuses to foster, constrained by extra-academic and illiberal objectives.

In short, “this is the great discussion in which we are engaged regarding technological humanism or complex democracy, whose solution cannot lie in uncontrolled technology nor in technocratic politics without popular sovereignty, but neither in insisting on a notion of control typical of technological and political populism, which in fact only diminishes the capacity to freely shape our personal and social lives” (p. 343). Put simply, the best remedy to prevent educational politics from sliding into mythological authoritarianism is to abandon deafness. Without real negotiation and shared participation, trust among students, teachers, and families will not be restored, and the crisis of representation will deepen, potentially culminating in revolt against the “bunker”.

What is desirable is to share needs and evolve through dialogue, without revolutionary or pseudo-heroic processes. Less epic, more agora. Ultimately, Innerarity writes: “A human world must be a negotiable world” (p. 368), and sectarian positions should be abandoned to allow for genuine debate on how certain models have been imposed without consulting the affected community or respecting its rhythms, spontaneous self-organisation, or dignity.

Source: educational EVIDENCE

Rights: Creative Commons