School leadership of state schools in Catalonia: a one-way journey… or a return trip?

We begin with an authoritarian and compliant model of headship, loyal to the Administration. / Photo: by AI

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Felipe J. de Vicente Algueró

It is impossible to separate the model of school leadership in Catalonia from that of Spain as a whole, as national legislation allows little scope for divergence. Even so, Catalonia has, at various times, sought to introduce meaningful variations within the Spanish framework.

During the Second Republic, for instance, the Generalitat was able to establish the so-called Institutos-Escuela (schools combining primary and secondary education). The most prominent of these was the one located in Barcelona’s Parc de la Ciutadella. It was governed by a specially appointed Patronato ad hoc (Board of Trustees) and was allowed to implement its own curriculum, distinct from that of other secondary schools. Nevertheless, it remained subject to certain legal conditions. In secondary education, for example, teaching staff had to include tenured catedráticos (senior lecturers) of the national Bachillerato system, appointed by the Patronato on a temporary secondment but paid by the State. Likewise, the director was chosen by the Patronato itself, unlike in other public schools, where appointments were made directly by the central administration. This would be the first—and short-lived—precedent for a Catalan management model operating within a state framework.

It was in primary education that various attempts were made to introduce a more professionalised form of school leadership. The Real Orden de 10 de marzo de 1911 (Royal Order of 10 March 1911) and the Reglamento de las Escuelas Graduadas de 1918 (Regulations for Graded Schools, 1918) were the earliest efforts to require certain qualifications for headteachers, such as prior teaching experience. Under the Second Republic, these requirements were expanded to include a written exercise on a pedagogical text, the development of a topic on school law and organisation, and the presentation of a lesson before a group of pupils. In larger schools, teachers took part in the election of the headteacher; in smaller ones, appointments were made by the administration. In all cases, however, the authority of the head was very limited and subject to the oversight of the Junta de Profesores—the body we would today call the staff council or teaching board.

In the so-called institutos de enseñanza media (secondary schools), the headteacher was always a catedrático (senior teacher), but had limited control over the rest of the catedráticos. Between 1901 and 1938, the catedráticos could propose a shortlist of candidates to the Ministry. The headteacher’s role was purely administrative and appointments were made directly by the Ministerio de Instrucción Pública (Ministry of Public Instruction).

The 1953 Ley de Enseñanza Media (Law on Secondary Education) provided a more detailed regulation of the headteacher’s role, stipulating that they would exercise overall authority over all teaching and administrative services within the school or attached to it. The headteacher was conceived as the direct representative of the Ministry that appointed them and to which they were accountable.

This 1953 law established a model of headship that would endure in later legislation: the headteacher was part of the public administration, an authentic representative of the Ministry, hierarchically above the rest of the teaching staff. Appointments were unlimited in duration (lasting until dismissal). The headteacher could appoint the head of studies after consulting the teaching staff and propose the appointment of a vice-head and a secretary. Importantly, they were responsible for selecting and appointing teachers on temporary contracts, a practice that opened the door to favouritism and arbitrariness. While their authority was significant, they were always subject to strict oversight by the appointing authority. In Catalonia, this model was followed rigorously, although by the late Franco era political loyalty had begun to weaken, and catedráticos increasingly held posts without close identification with the regime.

While in secondary education no specific professional preparation was required for headship, a more structured model gradually took shape in primary schooling. The Ley de Instrucción Primaria (Primary Education Law) of 1945 encouraged the professional development of teachers, authorising the Ministry to grant study leave for courses designed to prepare future headteachers. A more innovative step followed in 1965 with the creation of a dedicated corps of primary school heads—an initiative short-lived, as it was abolished by the Ley General de Educación (General Education Law) of 1970.

Focusing on secondary education, at the onset of the Transition, the model remained the same: the Ministry appointed the headteachers, who were in turn responsible for the appointment of teachers on temporary contracts. This model increasingly provoked protests, particularly from the powerful movement of so-called PNN (non-tenured teachers). The government began to relax its control, permitting teaching staff to propose shortlists for headteacher positions, which, in any case, had to be held by a catedrático. Despite the limited scope of this measure, it allowed for some renewal in management positions, particularly in Catalonia and in certain emblematic schools. Nevertheless, the system imploded and a fully assembly-based model emerged: the headteacher was appointed by the teaching staff (effectively a kind of parliament), the term of office was only one year, with the consequent instability, and no professional or length of service requirements were imposed. In some schools, annual headteacher elections were preceded by full-scale electoral campaigns, and usually, the candidate least likely to complicate the lives of the teaching staff was chosen. By this time, the Administration assumed responsibility for appointing teachers on temporary contracts.

In Catalonia, any model other than the assembly-based system was strongly rejected. “Co-management”, the anti-authoritarian model, was in vogue, with participation not only from teachers but also parents and administrative staff in the selection of the headteacher. In 1976, the national PNN coordinator, heavily influenced by Catalan teachers on temporary contracts, proposed a “Proyecto de gestión interna de los centros” (Internal School Management Project). The Asociación Rosa Sensat, very influential at the time, was the great defender of the so-called self-managed or democratic school. In some schools, this model was applied unilaterally; for example, at the Instituto Patronato Ribas, the secondary education inspectorate was unable to restore order, and for a time the school functioned almost anarchically. On one occasion, the chief inspector of secondary education, who attempted to speak with the teaching staff, had to leave through a window.

This model of headship arose in response to Francoist authoritarianism (even though Spain was now in democracy) and stemmed from a clear philosophy: the headteacher would never be a representative of the Administration nor part of it. The headteacher of a school was simply the executor of the decisions made by the teaching staff, who were the real decision-makers, and, if necessary, could act against the Administration itself, which could control schools only through inspections and with great difficulty.

The Ley Orgánica del Estatuto de Centros Escolares (LOECE, 1980) [Organic Law of the Statute of School Centres, 1980] sought to bring order to this model by introducing partial professionalisation. The headteacher was appointed by the Administration through a merit-based competition among tenured teachers, evaluated by the school’s governing council, the inspection service, and the Provincial Delegation of the Ministry. This system was hardly implemented, as the law was soon repealed.

In 1985, with the socialists in power, the Ley Orgánica de Educación (LODE) [Organic Education Law, 1985] attempted to channel the assembly-based model without eliminating it entirely, as the law’s drafters were heavily influenced by the self-managed school model. Under this law, the real management of the school was exercised by the newly created consejo escolar (school council), which was granted broad powers, including the election of the headteacher, who could be any teacher with at least one year’s length of service at the school and three years in teaching.

In short, the LODE model remained assembly-based, though the assembly was now the school council. Nevertheless, the teaching staff retained significant influence, given their weight within the council. The headteacher continued to be a representative of the school, not of the Administration, which merely ratified their appointment for a maximum of three years. Despite its apparently self-managed nature, in practice the model failed. Increasingly, schools found themselves without candidates for headship; for a small financial supplement, few were willing to become mere agents of the school council. Faced with this situation, the same government that had enacted the LODE approved a new law in 1995: the Ley Orgánica de Participación, Evaluación y Gobierno de los Centros Escolares (LOPEGCE) [Organic Law on Participation, Evaluation, and Governance of School Centres]. The law did not change the powers of the school councils, which retained the capacity to appoint the headteacher and manage the schools in practice. It improved the financial supplement and established an “accreditation” to become headteacher, obtained through training or previous service in a management post. The era in which anyone could become a headteacher ended; now, at least some preparation was required, and the term of office was extended to four years.

It was precisely in Catalonia, where the self-managed school model had taken deepest root, and perhaps for that reason, a strong movement emerged in favour of professionalised school leadership: the association Axia, made up of secondary school leaders advocating for the alignment of the Spanish headship model with the professionally established European model prevalent across most countries. Left-wing parties considered these proposals reactionary, dismissing them with minimal debate. With Convergència i Unió then governing the Generalitat, there was greater dialogue, without overt public support. Conversely, Axia’s proposals found a more receptive audience in the Partido Popular, which came to power in 1996, though without an absolute majority to amend the existing legislation, the two aforementioned laws, and the LOGSE (Ley Orgánica de Organización del Sistema Educativo, 1990), which made no innovations in the headship model.

However, in 2000, with an absolute majority, the PP was in a position to enact its own law. Contacts were initiated between the Ministry of Education, headed by Pilar del Castillo, and Axia. In 2001, a Congress on school leadership was held in Madrid, serving as a platform for Axia’s ideas. A Catalan headteacher delivered the final presentation, advocating professionalised headship.

In 2002, the Ley Orgánica de Calidad de la Educación (LOCE) [Organic Law on the Quality of Education, 2002] was enacted, establishing a new paradigm in headship and ending the previous assembly-based or semi-assembly model. Access to headship would be through selection based on a merit-based competition, evaluated by a committee composed of representatives of the Administration and, at least 30%, representatives of the school (although the law does not specify, it can be understood that these representatives would be designated by the teaching staff and the school council). The model closely resembled the much-criticised LOECE. In subsequent implementation, one-third of the committee were representatives of the teaching staff, specially appointed for this purpose; one-third were representatives of the school council who were not teachers at the school; and the final third were representatives of the Administration.

The law introduced a significant conceptual change (still in effect): headteachers would no longer be elected but selected. Furthermore, the headteacher was clearly configured as a representative of the Administration, granted broader powers, and their term extended to three years, renewable. Another novelty of the law was the stricter requirements than under the LOPEGCE: greater length of service and, above all, completion of a training course. In other words, headship was professionalised (at least partially) for the first time in Spain. This was exactly what Catalan headteachers of Axia had been demanding. Similar associations were subsequently created in other autonomous communities, eventually forming the strong lobby FEDADI (Federación de asociaciones de directores de instituto).

Despite strong criticism and opposition to the LOCE, particularly because detractors considered it a return to an authoritarian school model, when the socialists returned to power and enacted the LOE, Ley Orgánica de Educación (2006) [Organic Law of Education, 2006], they maintained the merit-based selection of headteachers, adjusting certain aspects of the previous law but essentially retaining the model. It preserved professionalisation and selection through a merit-based competition, increased the weight of the educational community in the selection committee, reduced executive functions, shared governance with the school council and teaching staff, and prioritised internal candidates while allowing external candidates to apply. Among the requirements was the submission of a management plan, a novelty with potentially significant consequences. The headteacher’s term was set at four renewable years. The headteacher could impose sanctions, something that had disappeared under democracy and had become an important subtle mechanism of pressure on teaching staff.

Subsequent laws, the Ley Orgánica de Mejora de la Calidad Educativa (LOMCE, 2013, del PP) [Organic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality] and the Ley Orgánica de Modificación de la Ley Orgánica por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica de Educación (LOMLOE, del PSOE, 2023) [Organic Law Amending the Organic Law of Education], substantially maintain the same model, with minor variations in the powers of school councils. However, one point is of great relevance: the composition of the committee responsible for evaluating the merits of headteacher candidates and consequently their selection. The LOMCE disrupted the balance between Administration representatives, school council, and teaching staff in favour of over-representation of the Administration, which could occupy more than half of the committee members. Despite strong opposition from the Generalitat to the LOMCE, the Departament d’Ensenyament hastened to implement the change in the composition of the selection committee: of the nine members, five were appointed by the Administration and four represented the school council and the teaching staff (DECRET 29/2015, de 3 de març, de modificació del Decret 155/2010, de 2 de novembre, de la direcció dels centres educatius públics i del personal directiu professional docent). The intent was clear: the Administration would ultimately decide which candidate was selected, a longstanding desideratum of the Generalitat.

The LOMLOE restored the balance: one-third Administration, one-third school council, and one-third teaching staff. Of course, all laws since the LOCE conceive of the headteacher as a representative of the Administration. However, in Catalonia, this model has important nuances. In the merit-based competition, objective merits are scored up to a maximum of 40 points, while subjective merits account for 60 points, clearly decisive. Moreover, the management plan is scored up to 40 points and “leadership capacity” (based on an interview with the candidate) 20 points. The management plan is key and constitutes the largest margin for ideologically biased selection rather than objective assessment.

The criteria for scoring the management plan include: the approach to student educational attention within an inclusive system, encompassing co-education and gender perspective, specifying co-education strategies for non-sexist education and tools for preventing and addressing various forms of violence in the school; and the alignment of the management plan with the system objectives defined by the Departamento de Educación y Formación Professional [Department of Education and Vocational Training] (Resolució EDF/47/2025, de 13 de gener, per la qual es convoca concurs de mèrits per seleccionar el director o directora de diversos centres educatius dependents del Departament d’Educació i Formació Professional). Curiously, directors are now required to fully adhere to the “gender perspective” and prevailing pedagogical dogmas, whereas under the 1953 law headship was aligned with the norms of Catholic Dogma and Morality and the fundamental principles of the National Movement.

If the objective is to have headteachers aligned with and identified with the prevailing pedagogical ideology, this goal has been achieved. Yet in Catalonia, a step backward toward past models has been taken. The Decreto 39/2014, de 25 de marzo, por el que se regulan los procedimientos para definir el perfil y la provisión de los puestos de trabajo docentes (Decreto de plantillas, 2014) allows state school headteachers to define specific requirements for certain teaching posts in line with the school’s educational plan and the management plan (art. 2.2). In short, headteachers can create specific posts with equally specific requirements. These positions are not publicly advertised but are filled by direct appointment, albeit disguised as a “selection committee”. The result is arbitrary provision of positions favouring personal loyalties to the headteacher, who effectively secures their benevolence by creating bespoke posts for favoured candidates. The system is deeply flawed, as it rewards personal loyalty to the head, encourages people to curry favour, and to wait in hope that an ad hoc post will be created for them.

Here is the final outcome: rather than a truly professionalised headship (as seen elsewhere in Europe), the system appears to revert to an authoritarian model, and what is most valued is the candidate’s alignment with the administration, of which they effectively become an agent. The Headteacher’s Strategic Plan becomes the crucial mechanism for selecting and filtering candidates. Is it really necessary when schools already have their educational project and operational regulations? Would it not be more logical for the candidate to explain how they would improve or implement the school’s educational project? The latter is participatory and less open to manipulation, whereas the former is highly so. Could a Strategic Plan that is not sufficiently woke and lacks the requisite references to projects, competences, and pedagogical jargon really make it through the selection process? Moreover, when it comes to reappointment, headteachers are assessed by the Administration — would they be judged favourably if they had not dutifully fulfilled the expectations of their appointing authority? A sophisticated but effective mechanism of dismissal for non-aligned headteachers is thus introduced. The Strategic Plan, if it exists, should be subordinate to the school’s educational project, yet the opposite occurs, ensuring that schools resistant to pedagogical trends comply via the Strategic Plan with prevailing educational ideology.

We begin with an authoritarian and compliant model of headship — loyal to the Administration, empowered to select teachers on temporary contracts and vested with broad authority, yet liable to dismissal if it falls out of line with the appointing body. After a long legislative journey, couched in sophisticated language about professionalisation, are we not, in the end, back where we started?

Source: educational EVIDENCE

Rights: Creative Commons